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Creditor Acquiescence as a Defense to an Exception
to Discharge in Bankruptcy
The growth of the consumer credit industry has made buying on time
a way of life for many.' Unfortunately, bankruptcy has also become a part
of this life for an increasing number of consumers.2 The Bankruptcy Act
of 18981 was designed primarily with businesses in mind,4 and even as
late as the major overhaul of the Act in 19385 the consumer credit industry
had not yet begun to grow to the proportions it has today reached., The
development of the large bank credit card industry only began in the
1960's.' The Bankruptcy Reform Act8 was written with an awareness of
the boom in consumer credit and was intended to make reforms in con-
sumer bankruptcy.' This revision provided consumer bankrupts with a
more complete fresh start.0
As a result of the growing use of bank credit cards in the last fifteen
years, questions have arisen concerning the effect of credit card abuse
on a straight consumer bankruptcy." Under section 523(a)(2)(A) of the 1978
1 H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 5964.
2 "[Tlhe number of bankruptcies [rose] over 2,000% [from 1938 to 1978]. The rise ...
paralleled the rise in the amount of consumer credit outstanding." See id. at 116.
3 11 U.S.C. § 1-1255 (1976).
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 4.
'Id. at 3.
Id. at 3, 4.
Before the 1960's, the high operating cost due to the volume of paperwork involved
kept most banks' attempts at credit card operations from succeeding. However, the develop-
ment of more sophisticated computers in the 1960's made credit card operations profitable.
By 1971 there were 60,000,000 bank cards in use.
Bank credit cards, such as Bankamericard, MasterCard, and Visa, are issued by local
banks. Bank cards differ from merchant cards in that there are three parties involved
rather than two: the creditor bank, the merchant, and the credit cardholder. The cardholder
makes charges with cooperating merchants, who in turn sell these accounts receivable to
the issuing bank, usually at a discount. Bank credit cards differ from company owned
"transportation and entertainment" cards such as Diners Club, Carte Blanche, and American
Express, in that they are available to more people, and there are no registration fees,
interest, or service charges if the monthly statement is paid in full within a specified period.
Transportation and entertainment cardholders are expected to pay their bills in full at
the end of each month, as the company's profit is not made from interest, but from dues
and merchants' fees. However, banks neither expect nor want their cardholders to pay
in full as over two-thirds of the bank's profits are made from interest charged on the un-
paid balance at the end of the month. The cre-t card operation is very lucrative for the
banks, as they may charge 1.5% interest per month, or 18% per year or more. See A.
GRIFFIN, THE CREDIT JUNGLE 1-42 (1971).
11 U.S.C. § 101-151326 (Supp. V 1981).
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 3-4.
" See id. at 118.
See generally 9A Am. JUR. 2d Bankruptcy § 791-793 (1980); Zaretsky, Intent to Repay,
23 WAYNE L. REv. 1073 (1977).
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Act, a debt created by fraud is not dischargeable." A necessary element
of this type of fraud is creditor reliance." Courts have not found it easy
to categorize creditor conduct as either reliance or acquiescence, especially
in the area of bank credit cards. 4
The purpose of this note is to determine the appropriate treatment
for credit card debts that the creditor claims have been fraudulently
incurred although culpable conduct by the creditor is also present. The
first part of the note examines the existing case law on the questions
of what conduct constitutes bank acquiescence and under what cir-
cumstances this "acquiescence" has been held to be a section 523 defense.
Secondly, the note explains why, in light of the policy of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act and the peculiarities of the bank credit card system, creditor
conduct which encourages credit card abuse should be a defense to a sec-
tion 523(a)(2)(A) proceeding.
CASE LAW: WHEN IS CREDITOR CONDUCT
A LEGALLY SUFFICIENT DEFENSE?
When applying for a chapter 7 straight bankruptcy liquidation, a debtor
seeks to have as many of his debts as possible discharged under section
727.15 In addition to the requirements of section 727, which include that
the bankrupt must be an individual" and must not have committed any
bankruptcy crimes, 7 the debts that the bankrupt is seeking to discharge
must not fall within any of the exceptions to discharge. 8
Under one of these exceptions, a debt will be nondischargeable if it
resulted from the obtaining of "money, property, or services" by "false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud."'9 There is little case
law interpreting this section, but courts have applied case law interpreting
the predecessor section21 to the present section 523(a)(2) questions, since
there was little substantive change between the old and new sections.21
Generally, to find a debt nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A), courts
have required three elements: that a false pretense or representation be
12 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
13 See In re Dolnick, 374 F. Supp. 84, 90 (N.D. Ill. 1974); In re Victorian, 8 Bankr. 196,
198 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Miller, 5 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980); see
also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 523.08[4] (15th ed. 1981); Zaretsky, supra note 11, at 1087.
" See infra notes 15-105 and accompanying text.
"1 See 11 U.S.C. S 727 (Supp. V 1981).
10 Id. S 727(a)(1).
17 Bankruptcy crimes include activities of the bankrupt such as destroying or conceal-
ing property or records of financial condition or business transactions, or failing to cooperate
with the bankruptcy process or court. See id. § 727(a)(2)-(7).
16 Id. § 523(a).
Id. S 523(a)(2)(A).
Bankruptcy Act § 17a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1970) (repealed 1978).
2 See, e.g., In re Talbot, 16 Bankr. 50, 53 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1981); In re Schnore, 13 Bankr.
249, 251 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); In re Miller, 5 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980).
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made, that it be made with fraudulent intent, and that it be relied upon
by the creditor.'
Recently, courts have struggled with the concept of creditor reliance,
or its converse, creditor "acquiescence" in the debtor's allegedly fraudulent
conduct." This section will analyze creditor conduct that has been
characterized as acquiescence, and the circumstances under which
acquiescence has been held to be a legally sufficient defense to a section
523 exception in recent cases.
Creditor Conduct: No Defense to Dischargeability
Bankruptcy courts in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have
recently held that a bank's acquiescence in a debtor's conduct should not
render the debt dischargeable if the debtor's conduct constitutes fraud,
false representation, or false pretenses sufficient to invoke section
523(a)(2)(A)."
I When a cardholder presents his card to a merchant, he does not say, "I intend to
repay this debt," but merely implies be will pay the debt. He also implies that he is using
the card in accordance with the terms of the credit contract.
The majority of bankruptcy courts hold that an implied representation of intent to pay
is sufficient to support a § 523(a)(2)(A) exception. See, e.g., In re Black, 373 F. Supp. 105
(E.D. Wis. 1974); In re Perticaro, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1298 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21,
1975); In re Gibson, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 449 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 1974); In re
Williamson, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 15 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. July 16, 1974); In re Engstrom,
1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 17 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Jan. 30, 1973).
However, a minority of courts still follow the decision of Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell,
115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941), which required that there
be an actual, overt representation in order to invoke the nondischargeability exception.
See In re Cameron, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 53 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 18, 1974); In re
Newberry, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 419 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Nov. 25, 1974); In re Wood, [1970-
1973 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 64,715 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1972); see also In re
Boydston, 520 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975) (did not specifically overrule Davison-Paxon but
noted that decision had been criticized). Some courts applying the Davison-Paxon rule have
indicated that the continued use of a credit card after an intent not to repay develops
may constitute conduct aimed at throwing the creditor off guard, thus bringing the debt
within the exception to discharge. See, e.g., In re Portz, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 51 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. July 22, 1974).
However, the determination of a debtor's subjective intent not to repay is very difficult.
Courts are influenced by the debtor's financial condition at the time the debt is incurred,
the amount of time between the charges and the filing of bankruptcy, the number of charges
made, the amount of the charges, whether an attorney had been consulted concerning filing
for bankruptcy before the charges were made, and whether the charges were above the
credit limit. See, e.g., In re Stewart, 7 Bankr. 551 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
A smaller minority of courts have held that charging over the credit limit is per se obtaining
property by false representations, and thus the intent of the debtor need not be determined.
See In re Curcio, 1 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1979); In re Schartner, 7 Bankr. 885 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1980); see also Zaretsky, supra note 11. However, what conduct legally constitutes
"intent not to repay" is beyond the scope of this note.
See Zaretsky, supra note 11, at 1087-89.
24 See In re Vegh, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 68,367 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 1981); In
re Pritchard, 11 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Wright, 8 Bankr.
625 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Kell, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
1982]
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The seminal case in the Fourth Circuit is In re Reinhart.' In Reinhart,
the bankrupt had utilized both false representations and false pretenses
in creating her credit card debt to the bank. 6 The court found, never-
theless, that the bank had been "noticeably negligent in handling this
account,"'2 principally by raising the bankrupt's credit limit from $300
to $1,000 when her payments were delinquent, granting two cash charges
over $50 inside the bank itself, and failing to keep copies of the cor-
respondence sent to the bankrupt concerning her account.' However, after
weighing the culpability of the bank's conduct against that of the bankrupt,
the court held that the bank's negligence did not exonerate the bankrupt.'
Reinhart's fraudulently created debts were not dischargeable even though
the bank had been negligent in failing to take action to prevent these
debts from accumulating. 0
Subsequent decisions by other bankruptcy courts in the Fourth Cir-
cuit indicate that acquiescence could be a defense to a section 523(a)(2)(A)
exception,' but the most recent case, In re Vegh,32 relied on Reinhart and
held that acquiescence could not be a legally sufficient defense.3 As in
Reinhart, there was overwhelming evidence of fraud: the bankrupt had
made approximately 600 purchases of less than $50 in one month, with
virtually no income.34 The court did not reach the factual question of
whether the bank had been negligent, because it held that "such negligence
is not a legally sufficient defense.'5
Reinhart and Vegh imply that acquiescence can never be a legally suffi-
cient defense to a section 523(a)(2)(A) exception. On their facts, however,
neither case decides the question of the legal effect of acquiescence when
the bankrupt's conduct is less culpable, as for example, when the bankrupt
has exceeded the credit limit but intent not to repay cannot be inferred
from the situatiofi.
In In re Pritchard, 3 a bankruptcy court in the Fifth Circuit similarly
held that bank acquiescence should not excuse the debtor if sufficient
debtor culpability is found.37 The court stated in dictum that "the failure
of the Bank to keep track of the status of the debtors' account would
1193 (Bankr. D. Colo. Oct. 27, 1980); In re Reinbart, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 666 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 1975).






See, e.g., In re Coleman, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1043 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 23, 1977).




"9 11 Bankr. 614 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1981).
' Id. at 618 (dictum).
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not excuse the debtors if, in fact, they had been guilty of any false
pretenses or fraudulent misrepresentations . . . ,,"1 Applying the strict
standard of Davison-Paxon Co. v. Caldwell,39 the court held that the
bankrupt had made no overt pretenses or representations 0 even though
the bankrupt owed $4,000 on a credit card account with a $300 limit, and
had not made any payments in the last seven months.4 The debt,
therefore, was discharged.2
The Pritchard court also found that the bank "had established no
routines whatever which would have enabled it to monitor the accounts
of its Master Charge customers."'43 Although the court conceded that this
failure was probably a factor contributing to the creation of such a large
debt, this action would still not excuse the debtors had they made false
representations." Under the Davison-Paxon standard, however, debtor
conduct would have to be very culpable in order for a creditor to invoke
a section 523(a)(2)(A) exception at all.45 Thus, In re Pritchard also leaves
open the question of the legal effect of acquiescence when debtor con-
duct is less culpable.
A case from the Sixth Circuit, First National Bank v. Wright,' implies
that in some cases irresponsible bank conduct will not excuse the
bankrupt's fraudulent conduct 7 In Wright, the bankrupt went on a month-
long buying spree preceding bankruptcy.4" The court concluded from the
evidence that the bankrupt knew she could not pay for the credit card
purchases.49 In her defense, the bankrupt claimed that.she had received
an extension of her credit limit before these purchases transpired and
thus believed her purchases to have been properly made." Without
deciding the factual question of whether or not an extension of credit
had been granted," the court held that if the defendant knew or should
have known that she could not pay for her purchases, the existence of
a credit limit to cover them was irrelevant. 2 Thus, even if the court in
Id.
115 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941).
'3 In re Pritchard, 11 Bankr. at 620. Under Davison-Paxon only an overt representation
(credit cardholder says "I will repay this debt"), not an implied representation (presenting
card implies it is being used within the terms of the contract), constitutes a false pretense
or representation. Davison-Paxon, 115 F.2d at 191. See generally supra note 22 (distinguishing
overt from implied representations).
, In re Pritchard, 11 Bankr. at 617.
" Id. at 620.
'3 Id. at 618.
44 Id.
41 See supra notes 22, 39-40 and accompanying text.
" 8 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
4 See id.







Wright had found that the bank acted negligently by raising the debtor's
credit limit, the debtor's conduct would not have been excused.'
The result in In re Wright implies that the court began with the underly-
ing premise that the credit card holder, and not the bank, is the party
who should be responsible for determining how much credit he or she
can responsibly maintain. This same premise can be seen in United Bank
of Denver v. Kell." In Kell, the debtor had returned a Master Charge card
due to his inability to pay the $2,000 balance," but had then reapplied
to the same bank for new Master Charge and Visa accounts, even though
he was involved in a chapter 13 bankruptcy. The bank, with knowledge
of the bankruptcy proceedings, approved the two new accounts and
allowed the debtor to exceed the new credit limit by twenty percent for
the next few months." The bankruptcy judge in Kel recognized that it
was "astounding" that the new accounts were approved but refused to
allow a discharge.58 Instead, the court ruled that the debtor had amassed
the new debts while he was "hopelessly insolvent," and thus could have
had no realistic expectations of paying the debts.59 This holding relieved
the bank of all responsibility for the new debts and prevented discharge.'
Creditor Conduct as a Defense to Nondischargeability
Other bankruptcy courts have held that irresponsible bank conduct may
constitute an acquiescence defense to a claimed section 523(a)(2)(A)
exception." In In re Curcio," the bankrupt's conduct did not attain the
level of culpability present in In re Veghl or In re Wright." The bankrupt
in Curcio had exceeded his credit limit of $1,400 by $712,5 but present
intent not to repay the debt had not been found.66 The debt had ac-
See id.
6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1193 (Bankr. D. Colo. Oct. 27, 1980).
Id. at 1194.
6 Id.
" Id. at 1194-95. The evidence showed that while the bank was aware of the pending
chapter 13 proceedings it failed to cross-reference the debtor's old account when it approved
the new credit cards. Id. at 1194 n.4.
' Id. at 1194.
" Id. at 1195.
6 Id.
61 See, e.g., In re Curcio, 1 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1979); In re Coleman, 3 BANKR.
CT. DEC. (CRR) 1043 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 23,1977, In re Whitehead, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
1647 (Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 19, 1976); In re Gibson, 1 BANER. CT. DEC. (CRR} 449 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 1974); see also In re Schartner, 7 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980);
In re McKinzie, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1092 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 5,1977); In re Cushingberry,
5 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 954 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 25, 1977) (although acquiescence would
have been a defense, bank's conduct did not constitute acquiescence).
62 1 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1979).
3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 68,367 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 1981). See supra text
accompanying notes 32-35.
" 8 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
6S 1 Bankr. 727, 728 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1979).
" See id. at 727; see also infra text accompanying note 70.
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cumulated over four months, but the bank had tried neither to revoke
the card nor suspend its use; instead, it had merely reminded the bankrupt
in his monthly statements that the credit limit had been exceeded." The
court held that the bank could not rely on the credit limit agreement
as a ground for nondischargeability because it had "waived" this right. 8
Instead, the court directed that
the issuer of a credit card must make a choice. If it intends to rely
upon an agreed charge limit, it must advise the holder of the card,
who exceeds the limit, that he is not to incur additional charges until
he has made payments to get under his charge limit. 9
This holding, if limited to the facts of the case, applies only to cases
where intent not to repay is not found. Because the court in Curcio held
that charging over the credit limit is per se obtaining property by false
pretenses or representations," it did not need to determine whether there
was an intent not to repay. Thus, this case does not address the issue
of whether irresponsible bank action would excuse a more culpable
bankrupt, who evinced an intent not to repay.
However, another case in the Sixth Circuit, In re Gibson,7 specifically
held that bank acquiescence can be a defense to a section 523(a)(2)(A) non-
dischargeability claim even when the evidence shows that there was a
present intent not to repay on the part of the bankrupt.2 In Gibson, the
bank continued to bill only a percentage of the total amount due, rather
than the entire amount over the credit limit." Consequently the court
found that the "bank seemed more than willing to permit the charges
to continue, with additions of the high finance charges typical in such
transactions,"" and allowed the debt to be discharged. 5 The court ap-
peared to rely on the rationale that banks should not be able to prevent
discharge of debts which they allow to continue due to the high interest
rates which they may charge.7 1
This same reasoning is found in In re Talbot,7 where the court ruled
that the creditor bank was "estopped" by its former conduct from seek-
ing to prevent discharge of the credit card debt. 8 In Talbot, the bank
had been notified that the debtor was considering declaring bankruptcy,
" 1 Bankr. at 728-29.
Id. at 729.
Id.
70 Id. at 728.





, Id. This rationale is found in other cases. See, e.g., In re Curcio, 1 Bankr. 727 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1979); See also In re Talbot, 16 Bankr. 50 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1981); infra notes
77-81 and accompanying text.
16 Bankr. 50 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1981).
28 Id. at 55.
19821
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but had allowed the debtor to exceed her credit limit, had authorized
purchases by telephone, and had even renewed the credit card. 9 In this
case, the court again implied that the bank had been willing to allow the
debt to accumulate in order to add on high finance charges."0 The court
appeared to balance this conduct against the debtor's relatively less
culpable conduct, and determined that estoppel should be applied."
Creditor conduct also constituted an acquiescence defense, under a dif-
ferent exception to discharge, in In re Whitehead." The Whitehead court
ruled that exceeding a credit limit amounted to "willful and malicious
conversion of the property of another."' However, since the bank had
continued to bill only a percentage of the total amount rather than re-
quiring the debtor to pay off the portion of the debt exceeding the credit
limit,' it had "impliedly ratified" an extension of the credit limit. 5 Thus,
there had been no conversion of the bank's line of credit,8 and the debt
was dischargeable."7 The Whitehead decision may be read narrowly, as
it relies on the "conversion of property" exception to dischargeability
rather than the "false pretenses" exception. However, the court stated
that "[tihe [blank ought not to sleep on its rights and fail to diligently
exercise the power of revocation and redelivery which it has."88 This im-
plies that the bank should be responsible for promptly taking all available
action in order to prevent large debts from accumulating." The Whitehead
decision, therefore, supports the position that bank acquiescence should
render section 523(a)(2)(A) exceptions dischargeable.
Creditor Conduct in Special Situations
A third line of cases stands for the proposition that the validity of the
defense of acquiescence depends upon the peculiarities of the bank credit
' Id. at 52.
See id.
81 See id.
2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (MRR) 1647, 1650 (Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 19, 1976). In this case an ex-
ception was claimed under a pre-1978 Act provision which provided that: "A discharge
in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts ... except such as
... (2) are liabilities for ... willful and malicious conversion of the property of another."
Bankruptcy Act 5 17a(2), 11 U.S.C. S 35(a)(2) (1970) (repealed 1978). This section has been
replaced in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 by S 523(a)(6), which reads: "(a) A discharge
... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt ... (6) for willful and malicious
injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."
2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 1650.
Id. at 1649.
Id. at 1650. Cf. In re Gibson, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 449,450 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept.
17, 1974), discussed supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.




See 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1646.
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card system.91 When a customer wishes to make a credit card purchase
exceeding a specified amount, the merchant is contractually obligated to
the issuer of the card to obtain approval of the purchases.92 If the card-
holder has exceeded his credit limit or is delinquent in his payments, the
approval will probably not be granted.9 3 However, no inquiry is required
when the transaction is for less than the specified amount.'
In section 523(a)(2)(A) cases, a problem arises because a cardholder can
often run up a substantial debt over the credit limit before the bank finds
out about it by making a number of purchases or obtaining cash advances
under the specified amount.95 The bank may not know about these pur-
chases immediately because no call for approval is required and because
merchants often hold the invoices for several days before presenting them
to the bank for payment.'
Because the bank has no chance to protect itself from these types of
purchases by early revocation of the card, it seems harsh to call the bank's
conduct acquiescence, with the result that this debt is dischargeable. 7
Courts have treated this situation differently. 8 In In re Stewart," the court
held that the bank's untimely actions would not constitute acquiescence
because of the bank's lack of opportunity to protect itself by revoking
the debtor's card.' 0 However, an earlier case, In re Cameron,' took a
different stand and held that under these facts the bank's conduct would
constitute acquiescence." 2 The court in Cameron reasoned that since the
bank by its procedures "waived" its ability to protect itself by revoking
the credit card, the bank could not assert that it had "relied" on any false
representations utilized in making the purchases."3 The Cameron court
believed that the bank should have exercised more responsibility because
it had the record of the cardholder's account and was thus in a position
to know when the credit limit had been exceeded."'
11 See, e.g., In re Stewart, 7 Bankr. 551 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980); In re Cameron, 1 BANKR.
CT. DEC. (CRR) 53 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 18, 1974).
1 See In re Pritchard, 11 Bankr. 614, 618 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1981); In re Stewart, 7 Bankr.
551 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980); In re Cameron, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 53 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
July 18, 1974). Under the contractual agreement between the bank and the merchant, the
bank guarantees to pay all credit charges under the specified amount regardless of whether
the cardholder can or does repay the bank.
13 See In re Schartner, 7 Bankr. 885, 888 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
" See In re Stewart, 7 Bankr. 551, 555 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
15 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Wright, 8 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
See In re Stewart, 7 Bankr. 551, 555 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
', See, e.g., id.
" See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.
7 Bankr. 551 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980).
,€ See id. at 556.
I' 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 53 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 18, 1974).





More courts have followed In re Stewart than In re Cameron,"5 part-
ially because it is easy to infer an intent not to repay when the debtor
has made many small purchases in a short period of time."' As in the
other credit card situations, the question of what a court should do in
a situation where bad intent cannot be inferred is unanswered.
Key Factors Used in Determining the Sufficiency of an Acquiescence Defense
Certain key factors which courts have used to determine whether
acquiescence should be a defense to a section 523(a)(2)(A) exception can
be distilled from these cases. The first and most important factor appears
to be the level of debtor culpability. 7 This factor arises from the attitude
that a debtor should be punished by preventing discharge of his debts
if his behavior reaches a certain level of culpability."'0 In determining the
debtor's culpability, courts have looked for evidence that the debtor knew,
or should have known, that he could not pay the debts he was incurring,
or that he intentionally circumvented the credit approval process. 09 The
more culpable the debtor's conduct, the less likely it is that creditor con-
duct, no matter how irresponsible or negligent, will constitute a defense
to a section 523 exception to discharge. °
A second factor is the degree of influence which the creditor's conduct
has upon the debtor's conduct."' If the creditor does not have time to
revoke the credit card, because of a bankruptcy-eve buying spree, or if
the creditor does not have the notification necessary to take action because
the debtor has kept his purchases under a specified amount, then creditor
conduct has not influenced the debtor in any way. However, if credit
charges go on for a number of months"2 so that the bank has notice of
"' See, e.g., First Nat'l. Bank v. Wright, 8 Bankr. 625 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re
Schartner, 7 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Reinhart, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
666 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 1975).
10 See In re Stewart, 7 Bankr. at 555.
"0 The existence of a high degree of debtor culpability appears to be the main reason
why debtors are denied an acquiescence defense in a S 523(a)(2)(A) proceeding. See supra
notes 24-45 and accompanying text.
1.. Congress obviously intended some debtors to be denied discharge of their debts or
it would have repealed S 523(a)(2)(A). It was left to the courts, however, to determine the
level of culpability to be punished. See 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
" See, e.g., In re Vegh, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 68,367 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 1981);
In re Stewart, 7 Bankr. 551 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980.
.1. See, e.g., In re Vegh, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 68,367 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 1981).
.. The bank's encouragement of the debtor's conduct appears to be the most important
reason why an acquiescence defense will be upheld in a § 523(a)(2)(A) proceeding. See supra
notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
... The amount of time necessary to give the bank notice seems to be relatively short,
since cases holding that bank conduct does not constitute acquiescence have required that
the bank take action within one to two months of the date the charges were made. See
e.g., In re Schartner, 7 Bankr. 885 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); In re McKinzie, 3 BANKR. CT.
DEC. (CRR) 1092 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 5, 1977); In re Cushingberry, 5 BANER. CT. DEC. (CRR)
954 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. July 25, 1977).
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the abuse, the bank is in a position to influence further action. If the bank
does not take action at this point, its actions have at least been a con-
tributing cause of the debt for which it seeks an exception to discharge.'
A third factor is the relative power of the two parties to prevent further
credit card abuse."' Banks have the requisite resources to calculate a
proper credit limit, to communicate and explain the relevant terms of
the contract to the cardholder, and to keep track of the debtor's account."'
A debtor may not have either the knowledge or ability to keep his credit
balance manageable,"6 and, in many cases, debtors do not fully understand
the terms of the contract.' 7 To the extent the debtor lacked the knowledge
or understanding to undertake an intentional and informed course of
fraudulent conduct, bank conduct allowing or encouraging this conduct
may be held to constitute a section 523 defense."'
A fourth and final factor is the extent to which a bank has allowed
irresponsible or fraudulent debtor conduct to continue because of the
bank's own interest in collecting high finance charges on the unpaid portion
of the debt."' This self-interest is found in cases where a bank has allowed
debts to go totally unpaid for a number of months, or where it has allowed
a cardholder to accumulate debts over the credit limit for a number of
months. The rationale for considering this factor is that a bank should
not be able to encourage irresponsible debtor conduct to its benefit, and
then benefit again from the very behavior it encouraged if the debtor
is forced into bankruptcy."'
WHEN SHOULD CREDITOR CONDUCT BE A LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT DEFENSE?
Policy of the Bankruptcy Act
Relief of the honest but overburdened debtor has been a concern of
the bankruptcy laws since the end of the nineteenth century."' By the
1970's, the opportunity for a fresh start was seen as a major concern of
the Bankruptcy Act."' The new Act continues the "fresh start" policy
,, See In re Pritchard, 11 Bankr. 614, 618 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1981).
' While this factor has not been articulated very often, it appears to be an underlying
equity consideration in several cases. See, e.g., In re Pritchard, 11 Bankr. at 616; In re
Whitehead, 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1647, 1651 (Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 19, 1976).
"' See infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
116 See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
"' See In re Kirby, 8 Bankr. 705, 708-09 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). But see First Nat'l Bank
v. Wright, 8 Bankr. 625, 627, 629 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio !981).
,19 See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
12 See In re Gibson, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 449, 450 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 1974).
121 DAVID STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 10 (1971).
11 See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); In re Dolnick, 374 F. Supp. 84,
90 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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with a particular focus on the problems of the consumer debtor.'" As noted
above, new awareness of the particular circumstances of the consumer
debtor was needed because of the amazing growth of the consumer credit
industry over the prior thirty years, and the parallel rise in the number
of bankruptcies."
The promulgators of the new Act were particularly concerned with the
inadequacy of relief that was provided for consumer debtors under the
old Act." The drafter's of the new Act instituted changes such as allowing
consumers larger exemptions of personal goods '26 and making it more
difficult for consumers to reaffirm discharged debts. 27 These changes
helped effectuate the purpose of the new Bankruptcy Act with respect
to consumers, that "bankruptcy relief should be effective, and should
provide the debtor with a fresh start."'28
The discharge provisions are the heart of the Act's fresh start policy.'"
The Senate Report accompanying the new Act stated that "[t]he discharge
provisions require the court to grant the debtor a discharge on all of his
debts except for very specific and serious infractions on his part."' In
this regard, the requirement that debts be provable in order to be
dischargeable was abolished,"' thus allowing a more "complete settlement
of the affairs of a bankrupt debtor . ... ""
The legislative intent shows that the new Act was intended to promote
the general policy of providing a complete fresh start for consumer debtors.
Because of this overriding policy, the exceptions to discharge sections
should be construed in favor of the bankrupt.'" The addition of subsec-
tion 523(d),1' also supports the "complete fresh start" policy. Under this
section, the court must award litigation costs to the debtor if the creditor
brings and loses a nondischargeability claim under section 523(a)(2), unless
the court finds this to be clearly inequitable. 35 This award includes not
only attorney's fees and court costs, but other pecuniary losses, such as
the loss of a day's pay. 36 By enacting this section, Congress hoped to
I2 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 4.
..4 Id. at 116. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
' H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 4.
11 U.S.C. S 522 (Supp. V 1981).11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (Supp. V 1981).
12 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 118.
12 11 U.S.C. S 727 (Supp. V 1981).
130 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5793.
,3 11 U.S.C. S 103(a) (1976) (repealed 1978).
, H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 180.
'"' See, e.g., Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558 (1915); Public Finance Corp. v. Taylor, 514
F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Dolnick, 374 F. Supp. 84, 90 (N.D. Ill. 1974); In re Wilson,
7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1061, 1065 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. June 25, 1981).
11 U.S.C. 5 523(d) (Supp. V 1981).
135 Id.
"3 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 1, at 365.
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discourage creditors from initiating questionable exception to discharge
actions with the intent of obtaining settlements from debtors who would
rather settle than pay the attorney's fees.137 Such practices, the drafters
felt, would "impair the debtor's fresh start."1 38 Thus, this section provides
the debtor a better chance of having his debt discharged by removing
the pressure to settle.
As the main provisions of section 523(a)(2) applicable to credit card cases
are left unchanged, it is obvious that Congress still intends to punish
clearly fraudulent uses of credit cards by excepting discharge of these
debts. However, when faced with new issues such as the legal effect of
creditor conduct, courts must keep in mind the clearly enunciated policy
of the new Act: consumer debtors are to be provided with effective and
complete relief in order to obtain a fresh start."
Peculiarities of the Bank Credit Card System
In light of the fraud prevention provisions of section 523(aX2), and the
fresh start policy of the Act as a whole, the question that must be asked
is whether the creditor or the bankrupt is in a better position to bear
the risk of irresponsible conduct which leads to bankruptcy.
In the factual situation presented by the typical three-party relation-
ship in bank credit card transactions','4 it is likely that only the bank knows
the full contract it has with each of the other two parties. Only the
bank has knowledge of the details of its contract with the merchant, such
as which purchases must be approved, the method of approval, and the
method of payment of credit invoices; and of the details of its contract
with the cardholder, such as the credit limit and monthly minimum pay-
ment computations.' The bank is necessarily in the best position to devise
and initiate safeguards against credit card abuse. The bank also has the
necessary equipment and manpower to keep up-to-date records of accounts,
enabling it to promptly respond to delinquent accounts.'' Most impor-
tantly, bank personnel have the requisite background and training in
economic matters to establish a maximum credit limit that will enable
the particular consumer to meet his payments with the income and assets
available to him.
Finally, the bank has an incentive to encourage a certain amount of
overextension' because it collects high finance charges on the credit it
extends to those debtors who do not pay their accounts in full after
137 Id.
135 Id.
11 See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
See generally supra note 7.
" In re Cameron, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 53, 54 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 18, 1974).
1" See id.
11 See GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 22.
" See generally supra notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
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receiving the monthly statement. '45 The eighty to eighty-five percent of
the cardholders who do not pay their statements in full can make a credit
card plan the most profitable operation a bank has.48 Thus, the banks
do not want to overly encourage prompt payment of- debts,'47 as they will
lose considerable profits.'48 All of this suggests that the banks should be
the ones to bear the risk if a debtor miscalculates and overextends himself
enough to go into bankruptcy.'
The consumer, on the other hand, is relatively less able to prevent
abuse. Consumer bankrupts are far less knowledgeable in the rudiments
of credit use than are banks.'5' The average consumer bankrupt has only
an eleventh grade education"' and has a distinct lack of knowledge and
ability in budgeting his money.'
Not only does the average consumer bankrupt lack the general
knowledge necessary to handle his debts, but he may also not be fully
informed of or understand the terms of the credit card contract.'" Bank
credit card applications are easily obtained, either at the bank'-' or through
... A bank may charge a rate of 1.5%/ per month, or 18% annually to cardholders who
do not pay their monthly statement within an agreed-upon period after they receive it.
There is no interest charged if the credit bill is paid monthly. This is called revolving
credit. See GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 24-26.
146 Id. at 27. The average consumer in 1970 paid $1 in revolving credit interest for every
$5 he charged on his credit card. Id. at 25.
" "Compared to installment loan borrowers, credit card owners are only lightly pressed
for payment, almost gently and tenderly." Id. at 24.
148 Id. at 24.
14 An even stronger case for the bank bearing the risk of loss by allowing dischargeability
is made if bankruptcy is caused by matters outside of the bankrupt's hands, such as a
job lay-off or a debilitating accident or illness. In a comprehensive study of debtors who
fall into default, Professor David Caplovitz found that the single most important reason
for the default was some reversal in the debtor's flow of income. This was reported to
be the primary factor in 43% of the cases studied and at least a contributing factor in
48%. D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 54 (1974). The
reversals in income were due to adverse changes in employment such as lay-offs, shorter
shifts, strikes, illness of the chief wage earner, and loss of a secondary wage earner's in-
come. Id. at 57-60.
" Less than 20% of all credit cardholders understand revolving credit. GRIFFIN, supra
note 7, at 24-25. See Note, Discharge Provisions in Consumer Bankruptcy: The Need for a
New Approach, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (1970).
116 STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 121, at 2 (data are from a Brookings Institute study of
cases closed in 1964). Debtors who fall into default are much less likely than the general
population to be high school graduates. A study of default debtors by Professor David
Caplovitz found that while 52% of the general population had graduated from high school,
only 39% of default debtors had. He suggests that it is "possible that poor education is
a direct cause of defaults. The poorly educated may have more difficulty budgeting their
incomes and may be more vulnerable to the pressures of unscrupulous salesmen urging
heavy debt burdens upon them." CAPLOVITZ, supra note 149, at 18-19.
111 "[Bankrupts] do not fully understand the meaning of four words: assets, liability, in-
come and expense. They do not realize that income must be kept in balance with expenses,
assets with liabilities." G. SULLIVAN, THE BOOM IN GOING BUST 103 (1968). In the Brookings
Institute study, 31% of the 400 bankrupts interviewed gave poor debt management as
the leading cause of their financial difficulties. See STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 121, at 47.
1" See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
"' See, e.g., In re Pritchard, 11 Bankr. 614, 616 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1981).
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the mail"' and the application may be filled in and the credit card issued
with no personal contact or explanation.'56 The credit limit is approved
by the bank, but may not always be communicated to the credit card
holder." Further, cardholders may not understand the effect of exceeding
the credit card limit"' and cardholders may believe they have received
a credit extension when they have not,"9 or may erringly believe a credit
extension is to be added onto the present limit. Especially in cases where
a cardholder has merely exceeded his credit limit, but no present intent
not to repay has been shown, it is arguable that the consumer might not
have been fully aware of the effects of his actions.
An Answer
Considering the strong fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Act and
the relative abilities of the parties to prevent credit card abuse, it is
apparent that the creditor banks should bear more responsibility for such
abuse. Courts generally have not used this analysis, but, at best, have
seemed to use a sliding-scale analysis, weighing the debtor's culpability
against that of the creditor, and picking an arbitrary point at which
acquiescence will become a sufficient defense.'' This approach has left
the law in a confused state and has not worked to deter fraudulent trans-
actions, contrary to the intent of section 523(a)(2)(A).' 6' If more respon-
sibility were required of those who are in a position to prevent abuse,
the banks,'62 the intent of section 523(a)(2)(A) would be better met.
In light of this policy, there appear to be only a few situations where
bank acquiescence should not be a defense to a section 523(a)(2)(A) claim
of nondischargeability. If the bank has taken affirmative measures to com-
municate the terms of the contract to the cardholder and then revokes
or suspends the card as soon as it is put on notice of an exceeded credit
limit, the bank should not be held to have acquiesced in the creation of
the debts. Likewise, if a debtor engages in a bankruptcy-eve spending
spree, purposely keeping his purchases below a specified amount to avoid
the bank's self-protection measures, the bank's conduct should not pro-
"' See GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 29-32.
"' See In re Pritchard, 11 Bankr. 614, 615 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1981).
... Id. at 616; see also In re Kirby, 8 Bankr. 705, 708 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
S The cardholders in In re Kirby, 8 Bankr. at 708, testified that they thought they were
free to use their credit card as long as they paid the minimum monthly charge. The credit
cardholder in In re Pritchard testified that he did not know what a credit limit was. 11
Bankr. at 616.
"u See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Wright, 8 Bankr. 625, 627 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (bankrupt
cardholder believed she had obtained an oral extension of her credit limit over the phone
although the bank testified that a credit application was required in order to obtain an
increase in a credit limit).
' See supra notes 15-120 and accompanying text.
'6, See Zaretsky, supra note 11, at 1075.
' See supra notes 14048 and accompanying text.
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vide an acquiescence defense because the bank has not had an opportunity
to prevent the debtor's action.
However, a bank should not be permitted to maintain that it has "relied"
on a cardholder's representation that he is acting in accordance with the
contract when the bank knows the credit limit has been exceeded and
permits the situation to continue. The bank should also not be permitted
to rely on a debtor's implied intent to repay when the bank has allowed
the debtor to continue to use his card even though a large debt has
accumulated and very little has been paid off. In these two situations,
the bank's actions have encouraged or at least have been a contributing
factor in the creation of the debt; such actions are, therefore, the type
of conduct that is meant to be discouraged by section 523(a)(2)(A). It would
be inequitable to allow the bank to benefit by invoking a section 523(a)(2)(A)
exception to discharge under these circumstances.
Application of the acquiescence defense in these situations would insure
more equitable results. For example, if this defense had been applied in
United Bank of Denver v. Kell,"3 the bank would not have been able to
prevent discharge of debts that had been charged on credit cards which
the bank had approved and issued after the debtor had already defaulted
on a prior credit card account and after the debtor had entered chapter
13 proceedings. This result would encourage banks to cross-reference their
credit card accounts and improve their credit application approval pro-
cedures which in turn would lead to less credit card abuse.
CONCLUSION
In light of both the policy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and
the peculiarities of the bank credit card system, creditor conduct which
encourages credit card abuse should constitute an acquiescence defense
to a claim of section 523(a)(2)(A) exception to discharge. Existing caselaw
is divided as to the sufficiency of an acquiescence defense. Courts have
seemed to use a balancing approach, weighing the culpabilities of the
debtor and the creditor. However, the fresh start policy of the new
Bankruptcy Act, coupled with the fact that many consumers do not have
the knowledge, economic sophistication, or power to prevent credit card
abuse, indicate that the exception to discharge provisions should be con-
strued in favor of the bankrupt and that the banks should bear more of
the responsibility to prevent credit card abuse. By disallowing a bank's
nondischargeability claim when bank acquiescence is present, the intent
of the legislators to provide a fresh start to consumers, while at the same
time discouraging fraudulent credit transactions, will be met.
ELIZABETH GAVIT FILIPOW
" [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] 6 BANER. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1193 (Bankr. D. Colo. Oct. 27,1980).
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